British in the Bay: The Washington Campaign

Fort Washington

Further Reading

An Overview of the British Attack on Washington and Baltimore

The British Attack Bladensburg and Move Onto Washington

The American Defeat at the Battle of Bladensburg

The British Sail Up the Potomac

Washington Burns

The British Attack on Baltimore

The American Defense of Baltimore

The Americans Prepare to Defend Washington and Baltimore

U.S. Secretary of War, John Armstrong, is responsible for the defense of both cities. He thinks the British will be tempted to attack Baltimore and that they will leave Washington alone. “They certainly will not come here (Washington),” Armstrong says. “What the devil will they do here? No! No! Baltimore is the place... that is of so much more consequence.” Consequently, Armstrong concentrates his resources in the Baltimore area.

To coordinate the defense preparations, Armstrong proposes veteran artillery officer Brigadier General Moses Porter. But President Madison overrules the secretary of war and gives the command to the militia’s Brigadier General William Winder. In peacetime, Winder is a Baltimore lawyer. His appointment has less to do with his military acumen than with the fact that his cousin is the governor of Maryland. In the weeks preceding the British landing at Benedict, Winder asks to call up at least 4,000 militia troops. But he is rebuffed by the cabinet, which insists that they troops only need to be mustered “once there is evidence of clear and present danger.”

Once the British land at Benedict on the Patuxent River, even Armstrong has to admit that Washington is in danger. What follows is a series of blunders that belong more in the realm of buffoonery, than that of serious military strategy. Secretary of State James Monroe rides towards Benedict with an escort of cavalrymen. His mission is to count the British ships and men. Monroe however, is afraid to get within three miles of town. He has also forgotten to bring his telescope. After sneaking around the periphery of Benedict for three days, he concludes that there are 6,000 British troops (there are actually only about 4,500). Meanwhile, none of the other US leaders think to obstruct the roads and bridges which lead to the capital.

Winder is now finally allowed to muster the militia. By August 20, he has 9,000 men under arms. But he’s not certain of the British strategy - it appears that they intend to attack Washington, but they may also bypass the capital and march on to Baltimore. Consequently, Winder divides his force. He deploys 5,000 soldiers in the Baltimore area and splits the remaining men into two separate detachments under Tobias Stansbury and Samuel Smith.

Leaving Smith’s brigade in Washington, Winder and Monroe, march off towards Benedict at the head of Stansbury’s men. The Americans bump into the advancing British troops and Winder promptly orders a retreat to Battalion Old Fields, about five miles south of Washington.

It finally dawns on Winder that Bladensburg is the strategic key to Washington. He orders Stansbury to deploy his troops to the east of the village in the best possible defensive position. Winder consults President Madison and the cabinet at every opportunity; the politicians in turn hover over his every move.

At first, Stansbury does exactly as ordered. On August 23, however, he sends Winder a message saying he’s just received a report (which will prove false) that the British are a mere six miles away and heading straight for Bladensburg. Stansbury decides to retreat at once. On the following morning, Stansbury sends another message: fearing that the British might cut him off, he continues his retreat back towards Washington. Winder orders Stansbury to stop the withdrawal and sends Smith’s force to join him at Bladensburg. Winder himself will meet them at the village.